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Abstract
Technological advances have resulted in organizations digitalizing many parts of their operations.
The threat landscape of cyberattacks is rapidly changing and the potential impact of such attacks is
uncertain, because there is a lack of effective metrics, tools and frameworks to understand and as-
sess the harm organizations face from cyber-attacks. In this article, we reflect on the literature on
harm, and how it has been conceptualized in disciplines such as criminology and economics, and
investigate how other notions such as risk and impact relate to harm. Based on an extensive litera-
ture survey and on reviewing news articles and databases reporting cyber-incidents, cybercrimes,
hacks and other attacks, we identify various types of harm and create a taxonomy of cyber-harms
encountered by organizations. This taxonomy comprises five broad themes: physical or digital
harm; economic harm; psychological harm; reputational harm; and social and societal harm. In
each of these themes, we present several cyber-harms that can result from cyber-attacks. To pro-
vide initial indications about how these different types of harm are connected and how cyber-harm
in general may propagate, this article also analyses and draws insight from four real-world case
studies, involving Sony (2011 and 2014), JPMorgan and Ashley Madison. We conclude by arguing
for the need for analytical tools for organizational cyber-harm, which can be based on a taxonomy
such as the one we propose here. These would allow organizations to identify corporate assets,
link these to different types of cyber-harm, measure those harms and, finally, consider the security
controls needed for the treatment of harm.
Key words: cybersecurity; risk; cyber-attack impacts; harm; organisational security; information systems
Introduction
Society depends heavily on technology for interaction, commerce
and industry. While technology has led to significant advances in
these areas, particularly through the use of Internet, it also has
exposed organizations and individuals to a host of new risks result-
ing from attacks through digital interfaces. These include, for
example, denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on networks, data breaches
on corporate and personal devices, and viruses that can cripple com-
puter infrastructures [1]. Theft of corporate secrets, sabotage of sys-
tems in order to compromise services and systems integrity, and the
copying of customer data to sell their identities on the dark web (in
order to facilitate other crimes) are all examples of the kinds of acts
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that are perpetrated and can all result in harm to an enterprise which
is dependent on digital technologies to conduct their business, and
which are often custodians of people’s data and metadata about
people. We initially define cyber-harm as the damage that arises as a
direct result of an attack conducted wholly or partially via digital
infrastructures, and the information, devices and software applica-
tions that these infrastructures are composed of. Understanding the
nature of such cyber-harm is critical to ensure that the controls and
methods of mitigation we deploy are effective and proportionate to
the risks. This article surveys the literature with a view to elucidate
the nature of cyber-harm and to underpin further research aimed at
analytical frameworks for reasoning about such harm.
Approaches to identifying risk arising from cyber-
attacks
To address risks arising from cyber-attacks, many and various solu-
tions have been proposed. These include processes and technologies
designed to prevent unauthorized and potentially threatening actors
from accessing the digital systems and assets. They also include
novel intrusion-detection and prevention systems designed to iden-
tify emergent threats and help organizations limit any resulting
harm. There is a general acceptance that digital infrastructures are
socio-technical systems, and therefore the people involved must also
be considered an attack surface for the purpose of preventing cyber-
attacks and mitigating cyber-risk.
Threats and attacks have traditionally been at the centre of
organizational security and cyber-risk discussions, as noted by the
US National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [2];
looking at these is an intuitive response, since to prevent cyber-harm
we must know how we might be attacked in cyberspace. One ap-
proach to assess the resulting harm is to be able to anticipate such
threats and their likely intent. An alternative to such a threat-driven
approach is to focus security risk analysis on assets and impacts first.
Here, the process involves the identification of the impacts on busi-
ness assets if they are compromised, and then consideration of the
threats that could lead to those impacts [2]. Such analysis identifies
and prioritizes those components that are critical for the organ-
izations’ mission. One advantage of an impact-oriented approach is
that the range of impacts that can be identified in an organization is
not driven solely by the knowledge of threats and attacks (which is
necessarily incomplete, as no one can be sure that they have com-
plete knowledge due to dynamic threat-landscape where novel
attacks are developed frequently). In an environment in which the
threat landscape for organizations changes rapidly and novel attack-
patterns continually emerge, understanding the potential impact of
these attacks on organizational assets may alleviate the associated
uncertainty, at least initially in risk-management activities.
Regardless of whether the risk analysis begins with threats to
assets, or with potential impact on assets, the ultimate result is the
enumeration and estimation of the greatest risks faced by an organ-
ization. Controls are then selected to address the risks deemed most
significant. The primary advantage of such risk-based approaches
(whichever is followed) is that the security budget and response are
set to be proportionate to the risks faced. Both critically depend
upon our ability to accurately prioritize such risks.
However, there exists very little data on the effectiveness of risk
controls once they are deployed, and how they might actually result
in lower risk exposure across all assets and functions of an organ-
ization. This means that we lack the scientific framework or founda-
tion upon which to select and compare the relative benefits of these
controls. We suggest that there is a comparable lack of knowledge
of the harm, which might result from cyber-attacks. It is this lack of
knowledge that may result in the deployment of controls incapable
of mitigating the overall harm. Such limitations may prevent us
from identifying and understanding all the potential harms that can
result and the relationships that might exist between them.
Essentially, we may be selecting our risk treatments and controls
based on knowledge that does not fully take account of the ways in
which harm can emerge, nor of the breadth of harms that can result
from a single cyber-attack. If one simply takes each risk and treats it
in isolation, one may not see the connection between various risks
and the cascade of harms that can result.
Why we need a taxonomy of cyber-harm for
organizations
In this article, we present a prototype taxonomy of organizational
cyber-harm which should help researchers and practitioners alike to
consider the full range of harms that might result from cyber-
attacks, when developing risk treatments. This is necessary to under-
pin our assessment of risk, and also our ability to quantify the harm
resulting from such risks. We explore the topic of cyber-harm, with
the intention of developing a more holistic understanding of what
constitutes organizational cyber-harm than is available in the extant
literature. In what follows, we critically examine cyber-harm,
including how it and related topics such as cyber-risk, criminology
and cyber-economics, feature in existing research and practice as
documented in the literature. Next, we focus specifically on defining
a taxonomy of the various types of organizational cyber-harm. This
is required to adequately model and reason about harms. We present
and draw insights from four case studies in order to provide initial
indications about how different types of harm in our taxonomy are
connected and how cyber-harm may propagate.
Finally, we conclude our work with a brief discussion of the
need for analytical tools for organizational cyber-harm. One such
tool, in the form of a conceptual model based on our taxonomy and
general reflection, is considered which could enable organizations to
better understand, achieve and enhance their cybersecurity. We ex-
pect to reveal nuances about how these harms may be linked and
how their negative impacts on organizations might be measured,
and ultimately to support cybersecurity tasks such as harm reduction
and the prioritization of cyber-risk for treatment.
What is cyber-harm for organizations?
Traditional definitions of harm
Harm is a concept that has been researched in-depth in various fields
including philosophy, psychology, sociology and law; but signifi-
cantly less in cybersecurity. In the dictionary definitions of harm, the
most common relates it to hurt, injury or damage of some sort [3].
Although these definitions may be regarded as accurate representa-
tions of the meaning being conveyed, they arguably oversimplify a
complex concept that has been the subject of significant thinking
and research effort over the last few decades.
In law, for instance, even though the definitions of harm concen-
trate on injury and damage (as described above), they often extend
this to consider the ‘subject’ of harm, i.e. an individual or the inter-
ests of a collective [4]. An example of ‘ultimate harm’ in the context
of an individual, therefore, is death. The medical domain maintains
a similar interpretation of harm and focuses on ill-treatment or im-
pairment of an individual’s health [5]. Harm is so core to the prac-
tice of medicine that many regard the primary duty of a physician as



































































































ascribing to the principle of non-maleficence, i.e. literally doing no
harm [5].
Kleinig provides one of the more critical and philosophical dis-
cussions on harm, and synthesizes traditional definitions as well as
existing research from several disciplines including law, ethics,
health and philosophy [6]. Based on his comprehensive reflection, he
suggests that harm may be understood as the impairment of the wel-
fare interests of a being, with welfare interests regarded as those ne-
cessary to the functioning of individuals as purposeful, self-reflective
and responsible agents. This description is insightful for at least two
reasons. First, it highlights the conventional use of harm to define a
negative consequence (as a result of some action), and secondly, it
centres on beings or individuals as the typical subject of harm. This
definition accurately captures the use and understanding of harm in
other areas such as psychology (e.g. self-harm), medicine and law
(e.g. harm to individuals) [7].
In recent years, harm has increasingly been applied in broader
contexts, such as harm to companies or industries. For instance,
there has been research exploring how environmental violation
events harm the reputation of an organization [8] and more topical-
ly, analysis of how cyber-attacks can result in harm to businesses
and even to the economy of a nation [9, 10].
The relationship between harm, impact and risk in
organizations
Narrowing our focus to the enterprise context, two concepts closely
related to harm are ‘impact’ and ‘risk’. Both of these concepts fea-
ture prominently in the literature and practice of organizational in-
formation security. Broadly speaking, impact is the effect of an
action by one person or thing upon another and can be either posi-
tive or negative. This characterization of impact as a generic term is
supported by others in security across academia and government
[11, 12].
The European Union for Network and Information Security
Agency (ENISA) defines impact as the result of an unwanted inci-
dent [13]; this is a definition it borrows from the International
Organization for Standardization and the International
Electrotechnical Commission (ISO/IEC) [14]. Whilst not definitive,
the arguable suggestion here is that impact is adverse. For the NIST,
developing an understanding of impact is a significant component of
the risk management process for organizations. They describe im-
pact as the ‘harm that can be expected to result’ from consequences
of unauthorized actions or loss of confidentiality, integrity or avail-
ability [2]. Their appreciation of impact is clearly oriented on harm,
potentially with the intent of stressing ‘impact’ as undesirable or an
impairment of organizational interests. A significant observation
that can be made based on our reflection so far is that, although im-
pact is a non-specific term, in security, it often implies a negative
outcome [11]. On occasion, this adverse meaning is made explicit
through the use of words such as harm.
The term ‘risk’ is associated with many of the concepts presented
above and its theoretical underpinnings are provided by the seminal
works of Beck and Giddens [15–17]. According to Beck [17], risk is
a modern concept that presupposes decision-making and is a result
of the speed of modernization that has transformed our society to a
risk society. The increased influence of science and the technological
innovations have resulted in two major transformations that define
the era of risk society. The first transformation, namely the end of
nature refers to the fact that almost all aspects of the physical world
are influenced by human interventions, shifting the focus of atten-
tion from ‘what nature could do to us’ to ‘what we have done to
nature’ . The second transformation, namely the end of tradition,
describes ‘a process of individualisation’ [16], where people question
traditions, institutions and old societal norms.
A risk society that has experienced these two transformations
experiences ‘uncontrollable risk’ because the risks are now
‘manufactured, second-ordered and unnatural’ [17]. Unanticipated
advances in technology can increase the gap between actual and per-
ceived risks, transform visible risks to invisible to virtual and render
these risks borderless—a concept described by Giddens as the ‘scien-
tization of nature’, ‘the colonization of nature’ or ‘the end of nature’
[16]. Therefore, the traditional concept of risk perceived as the prob-
ability of an adverse event multiplied by the magnitude of impact
must be expanded. In order to expand our understanding of risk,
Beck and Giddens suggest that manufactured risks can be analysed
in three dimensions: spatial, temporal and social. Spatial, because
these risks cross national borders and can affect the globe; temporal
because manufactured risks may influence generations that have not
been born yet; and social because the effects are a combination of
actions of many individuals that shift individual risks to systemic
risks.
A major concern with manufactured risks is that societies experi-
ence a denial of responsibility from organizations and individuals
for creating these risks which results in avoidance of action in terms
of risk management, a concept coined as ‘organised irresponsibility’
[15]. Organized irresponsibility disincentives organizations to invest
in controls to mitigate harms and to provide compensation for indi-
viduals, despite the fact that they acknowledge the reality of cata-
strophes [15]. Whilst the risks that Beck and Giddens describe in
risk societies are inspired by advances in nuclear, chemical and bio-
medical technologies, advances in information technology and
cyberspace share the same characteristics. Therefore, all these con-
cepts can be adopted from the risk community to help understand
the nature of cyber-harm to an organization, by designing a tax-
onomy on cyber-harms. We believe that such a taxonomy will help
enterprises to engage in security risk management tasks intended to
identify, assess, prioritize and treat the various risks that they face.
Insights from criminology and white collar crimes
A stream of literature where harm has a pivotal role is criminology
in general and the study of white-collar crime in particular.
Criminologists, due to difficulties in defining crimes and identifying
their detrimental impact, propose to depart from the notion of crime
and focus on that of social harm [18–21]. Therefore, harm is key to
social policy and observations of different types of harm occurring
from crimes shape practical guidance [19], rendering the develop-
ment of sound methods to systematically assess harm of increasing
importance. Greenfield et al. [19], present a framework comprising
a set of processes to empirically assess harm. They identify five key
dimensions where harm may manifest, namely: functional integrity;
material support and amenity; freedom from humiliation; privacy or
autonomy; and reputation. They also define five magnitude levels of
these types of harm and examine the cascading nature of harm by
examining real-world crimes that have caused severe harm to
society.
In a similar vein, Van Slyke et al. [18] construct a taxonomy of
harms for white-collar crimes by focusing on the victimization elem-
ent of these crimes. They examine a series of white-collar crimes and
list the costs arising from these offences. They complement desktop
research with victim surveys, and focus on the severe lasting effect
of harms in certain individuals. Further insights are provided by sug-
gesting that harms can be conceptualized as a pyramid, with chronic



































































































harms at the top, ‘one-off’ victims who suffered severe losses in the
middle and victims who are unaware of the fraud, or have incurred
small costs, at the bottom. Secondary effects of harm are also con-
sidered, with the authors suggesting that these relate to victims who
experience great losses or suffer psychological effects.
Furthermore, Van Slyke’s study considers harms that may relate
not only to individuals but also to other stakeholders, such as com-
munities, neighbourhoods, governments and society at large.
Specific focus is also given to calculating the costs of crime, with the
authors arguing for three types of costs, those incurred in anticipa-
tion of a crime, those incurred as a consequence of it and those in
responding to it. They suggest two approaches to calculating these
costs: ‘bottom-up’ based on surveying crime cases and estimating in-
dividually different harms; and ‘top-down’, trying to estimate how
much the public is willing to pay to avoid or reduce these crimes.
Brenner presents the first approach to identify metrics for estimating
crime that originates in cyberspace [22]. Although she acknowledges
that designing metrics and scales for cybercrime is extremely diffi-
cult, due to ‘apprehension’, scale and evidence issues, she proposes a
simple taxonomy of harms consisting of three main types, namely
individual, systemic and inchoate.
The researchers in the discipline of criminology studied in this
survey all concur that estimating the cost of crimes, as well as pro-
viding models for assessing harms, present significant technical and
methodological challenges [18–20]. These challenges arise due to
limited utility of conventional research tools such as surveys, poor
statistical data obtained by law-enforcement agencies and the ten-
dency of individuals to conceal crimes from the authorities due to
embarrassment or lack of ways to report these crimes [18]. In add-
ition, only a small percentage of cases are prosecuted and there is no
consolidated source of information aggregating different crimes or
incidents. The keen reader will have recognized the stark similarities
with incidents in cyberspace. There are several lessons to be learnt
from the discipline of criminology, but we need to emphasize that
all the approaches from this context determine harm arising from
specific crimes, whereas in this article, we present an asset-driven
approach. There are clearly parallels between non-cyber-crime and
cyber-crimes from a harm perspective (since their victims are com-
mon), which can be used to design a taxonomy of cyber-harm.
Cyber-economics
Felici et al. [23] emphasize the need to further explore the field of
economics by focusing on cyber-incidents. They postulate that ICT
stimulates new markets and is integrated into current economic sec-
tors that foster growth. They argue that the field of cybersecurity
economics is essential in assisting ICT to hold this dual role. They
further suggest that challenges in this field require a multidisciplin-
ary approach and that models created by researchers must acknow-
ledge the new information regarding cyber-incidents, their impact
and their relations to the dynamics of other cyber-actors.
Anderson et al. [24] are pioneers in providing a first approach to
measuring costs of cyber-incidents. In their article, they highlight the
difficulties in assessing impact due to the fast pace of technological
developments and the large asymmetries between estimating costs
and revenues and their real values. Similar to the models presented
in the criminology literature, in their model Anderson et al. equate
harm with cost and consider direct and indirect costs, defence and
crime costs, as well as costs to society. They extend their work by
considering concepts from economics such as the ‘moral-hazard
effect’, the hidden-action problem and network neutrality, amongst
others, to provide a holistic understanding on the economics of in-
formation security [25].
In a similar vein, Moore highlights further challenges in the field
of economics of cybersecurity [26]. Drawing from concepts from the
field of economics, Moore identifies challenges, inter alia, mis-
aligned incentives such as the natural tension between efficiency and
resilience in IT systems, information asymmetries and externalities.
He suggests that to overcome these challenges regulatory interven-
tion is necessary. Moore further identifies online identity theft, in-
dustrial cyber-espionage, critical infrastructure protection and
botnets as the most persistent threats in cybersecurity and proposes
a series of regulatory solution options.
Other efforts focus on the evolution of risk frameworks, model-
ling the resilience of business systems [27]. In these models, research-
ers try to understand how catastrophes may disrupt globally critical
services by examining the interconnectedness of assets. A threat-
based model is created and each threat: is attributed with different
mechanisms of destruction; is related to specific vulnerabilities; and
presents different challenges for the resilience of systems. The tax-
onomy of threats is developed through an extensive review of histor-
ical incidents extended as far back as in 1000AD. Similarly to crime
taxonomies, correlations and triggering mechanisms for various
types of catastrophes are sought. One of the many classes of threat
examined by this article is cyber-threat.
A similar approach is proposed by Lloyds of London, where they
consider fictional but realistic scenarios to understand the concept
of cyber-risk aggregation [28]. The authors of the report note that
cyber-risk is a growing global threat due to the increase in cyber-
incidents during the last years. They utilize two fictional scenarios,
namely a ‘cloud service provider’ hack and a ‘mass vulnerability’,
and seek to calculate direct and indirect costs for both organizations
and insurers. They conclude that the potential for a cyber-attack to
sweep through many organizations and the secondary effects of the
attack due to interdependencies between organizations could have
disastrous consequences.
There are a few institutes, which provide aggregate data and
publish annual reports of cyber-incidents. For example, the Cyber
Security Breaches Survey (CSBS) from the UK Government annually
captures trends in cyber-incidents and details of cybersecurity risks
[29]. The report presents statistics about how organizations operate
in cyberspace and identifies common types of threat. To comment
briefly on key findings in the 2017 report, the survey highlights that
all UK businesses are potentially exposed to cyber-threats.
Government sources of guidance on cybersecurity threats remain
few, but 75% of the organizations, which take advantage of this in-
formation, find it useful. They have identified that a sizeable propor-
tion of businesses still lack security controls despite the fact that the
vast majority of them have increased their cybersecurity budget. The
most common types of successful attacks are related to staff receiv-
ing fraudulent emails (in 72% of cases where firms identified a suc-
cessful attack or an attempt). The next most common issue is related
to viruses, spyware and malware (33%), people impersonating the
organization in emails or online (27%) and ransomware (17%).
Based on such reports and drawing on their previous work [24,
25], Anderson et al. provide a set of recommendations in order to
address the lack of statistical data in the European Union (EU) and
to further the field of security economics [30]. They propose to the
EU the introduction of a comprehensive security-breach notification
law and the publication of loss statistics. They also identify that
common vulnerabilities can trigger cascading effects in cyber-
attacks and propose diversity as a security measure. Finally, they



































































































highlight the problem of moral hazard in Critical National
Infrastructure (CNI) and propose the regulation of best practice
approaches to cybersecurity for these stakeholders.
Focusing on the incentives for CNI and regulatory approaches,
Laube et al. examine the economics of mandatory security-breech
reporting to authorities [31]. They design a principal-agent model
able to describe conflicts of interest between regulators and organ-
izations. Their model considers security investment and firms’ inter-
dependence, mandatory security-breach reporting and security
audits. They conclude that laws, which enforce mandatory security-
breach reporting are essential for high-security interdependent firms
with the premise that disclosure costs are low.
Kshetri attempts to define a cost-benefit calculus using a similar
methodology to Laube et al. [32], but he focuses on the perspective
of the attacker. He identifies characteristics of cyber-criminals,
cyber-crime victims and law-enforcement agents and argues that
these three classes of entity, when they interact, lead to a vicious cir-
cle of cyber-crime. He provides a calculus that considers the benefits
and costs to an attacker and reasons about whether a cyber-crime
may occur. It is worth noting that the authors suggest that psycho-
logical effects as well as criminal conviction are part of an attacker’s
benefits or losses.
Edwards et al. [33], explore a publicly available dataset of data
breaches and apply a Bayesian Generalised Linear Model to unveil
trends in data breaches. They conclude that the size and frequency
of data breaches has been stable in recent years, but their impact is
growing due to the ability of threat-actors to monetize personal in-
formation better and to the increasing number of electronic financial
transactions. An interesting approach, based on the ‘top-down’
methodology described in the criminology field, is presented by
Nguyen et al. [34]. The authors attempted to elicit ‘premiums’ that
some users would be willing to pay to protect their assets from
cyber-incidents. Their results show that participants in their survey
were willing to pay a premium of between $9 and $11 monthly to
protect their social-media accounts, while they were willing to wait
between 8 and 9 additional minutes to receive their emails, provided
these would be free of spam and phishing emails.
Much of the research on cyber-economics is naturally intended
to be viewed through a societal or supply-chain economy lens, but it
has consequences for organizations as well and places harm located
at a single organization in the context of the wider societal actors
who can implement levers which can help organizations mitigate
such harms and mandate or incentivize behaviours necessary for
success.
Monetizing cyber-incidents
The ability to quantify harm would allow an organization to make
better decisions regarding the treatment of a particular risk. We
have reflected on current literature to determine the extent to which
techniques exist to quantify cyber-harm (or indeed, attack impact).
Generally, we found that there is a lack of effective metrics, tools
and frameworks for estimating the harm from cyber-attacks on
organizations. The approaches that we have identified are either
quantitative or qualitative in nature. Most approaches endeavour to
monetize the metric output values, in terms of financial loss, in order
to be able to compare harm between cyber-incidents. These
approaches consider direct and indirect costs emanating from a
cyber-attack for different harms [35–38].
Fluctuations in stock market prices have attracted the interest of
many researchers, the idea being to compare the price of the stock
before and after a cyber-attack. Telang and Wattel [36] focus on
software-development companies and report that on average ven-
dors lose 0.6% of their market value when software vulnerabilities
are exposed. Regarding exposure or leakage of customer data,
Acquisti et al. [37] provide significant statistical evidence that there
is a negative short-term impact on the value of stocks, but this effect
decreases rapidly over time. Further evidence of the negative effects
on the market value of an organization that may arise from a cyber-
breach once it is made public is presented by Cavusoglu, Mishra and
Raghunathan [38]. More recently, there have been concerns regard-
ing associating fluctuations in stock prices with cyber-incidents and,
in particular, with data breaches [39].
There are types of attacks, however, that do not seem to have
an impact on the value of the stock of organizations, such as DoS
[40]. In a similar vein, Campbell et al. [41] suggest that there is no
impact when the security breach concerns non-sensitive data. There
is a distinguishable difference, though, when the breach concerns
confidential data, causing the market value of the organization to
drop briefly. Finally, Kannan, Rees and Sridhar argue that there is
no significant difference in the loss of market value depending on
whether the security breach affects the confidentiality, availability
or integrity of data [42]. These are all interesting points, but they
attest to the difficulty of characterization and quantification of
cyber-harm.
Other approaches have focused on ‘measuring’ harm by way
of qualitative severity levels (or brackets, similar to high, me-
dium, low) based on whether certain attacks have harms within
defined criteria thresholds. One article, for example, outlines six
main levels of risk impact from minor (1) to business-critical (6),
and attributes for impact criteria include reputation, human cap-
ital and financial [14]. For minor impact, the thresholds are as
follows: the reputation threshold is zero to limited negative publi-
city and no impact on the institution’s reputation; human capital
threshold is that the attack affects less than 5% of employees and
there is no impact on recruitment or retention of staff; and the fi-
nancial threshold is an annual loss of less than $1 million in the
current fiscal year. Each of these thresholds (and associated val-
ues) increases as the rating progresses from minor through to
moderate, substantial, serious, severe and business-critical. The
advantage of such a quasi-quantified approach lies in the fact
that accuracy in metrics is not required and it may be possible to
obtain a rough estimate of the harm quickly. These thresholds
would, of course, change depending on the enterprise.
A very promising approach to quantifying harm is detailed in a
report published by the World Economic Forum [43]. The aim of
their approach is to understand the benefits from digitalizing func-
tions and services of organizations, the costs that may occur when
attacks may be realized, determining the threat imposed to organ-
izations and to try to find the optimal investment in cybersecurity.
They introduce the notion of the cyber-Value-at-Risk (VaR) a ‘risk
measure for a given portfolio and time horizon as a threshold loss
value’ [43]. VaR considers the probability that a loss will exceed the
profits in a given time. Those authors outline the properties that the
Cyber-VaR value should have, but highlight that they do not pro-
vide the means to quantify and compute these properties. A com-
pleted model would be able to provide answers such as ‘given a
successful cyber-attack, a company will lose not more than X
amount of money over a period of time, with 95% accuracy’ [43].
The core components of such a model are quantifying the assets
under threat, computing the vulnerabilities and creating threat pro-
files of attackers. In terms of harms, they provide an example of
how the assets of an oil company may be impacted and identify
harms regarding future revenue loss, litigation and public relations



































































































costs, business interruption costs and reputational damage, even
bankruptcy if the attack is persistent for a certain number of days.
It is evident that models reasoning about harm are scarce and are
either based on fictional scenarios or try to reason about harms
based on statistical data about costs. However, the quantification of
harm is still an unsolved problem for organizations. Most
approaches have focused on insight from stock-market prices; how-
ever, they fall short in estimating the harm related to cyber-attacks
and incidents. This is because usually drops in stock-market prices
are brief [40, 41], while costs that relate to other types of harm such
as physical damages or incident response costs are neglected. Cyber-
VaR is promising but much more needs to be done before this
becomes a viable option for organizations.
In summary, therefore, we believe that a model that is asset-
driven may provide a different perspective on the notion of cyber-
harm and insights from criminology and other fields can underpin
such efforts. Further research is required on the topic of the quantifi-
cation of harms (both direct and indirect), potentially through the
linkage with assets and threats. We will return to this observation at
the conclusion of this article as it provides inspiration for how to
evolve from a cyber-harm taxonomy to a model capable of under-
pinning analytics on cyber-harm and the effectiveness of risk con-
trols in addressing it.
Emergence of cyber-harm as a concept in organizations
The origin of cyber-harm is firmly rooted in the psychological do-
main and describes the harm or negative impact to individuals that
might occur as a result of interactions in cyberspace (e.g. cyberbully-
ing) [44, 45]. In recent years, that term, similarly to ‘harm’ itself, has
been expanded and applied to more general contexts. The adapta-
tion of cyber-harm to cybersecurity more broadly builds on this
conceptualization, and aims to focus on the adverse impacts of
cyber-attacks across all stakeholders, including individuals, com-
munities, organizations and nations. For instance, there is literature
exploring cyber-harm in the domain of cyber-warfare [46, 47].
Here, cyber-harm is loosely perceived as harm perpetrated via the
Internet or similar electronic means, most often involving some
form of cyber-incident or intentional attack (such as an outsider
hacking into an enterprise or an insider inserting an infected drive
into a workstation). This description encompasses other research
work that suggests that cyber-harm may also be caused via other
means, such as cyber-exploitation, where the goal of the attack is
primarily to obtain data from the targeted system [48].
To consider cyber-harm in the context of organizations, there-
fore, is to consider the detrimental impacts resulting from cyber-
events or incidents that could take place that would involve the
organization in any fashion. Incidents could be intentional attacks
such as compromising systems, or unintentional due to mistakes,
user errors or broadly natural phenomena, and may derive from ex-
ternal parties as well as from within the organization. This distinc-
tion of harm to intentional and unintentional has traditionally been
localised to cyber-assets: for instance, a computer network might be
infected or a web server forced offline because of a DoS attack. But
the reliance of society on technology has positioned such harm also
in the physical sphere. The consequence of this is that as cyber and
physical spaces overlap, attacks on enterprises using cyberspace can
have a tangible, offline harm. As the US Department of Homeland
Security states, such harm could also include physical damage to
property or bodily harm [49]. Our understanding of cyber-harm
should not be limited to the online components of a system, but ra-
ther should be extended to include the offline components as well.
There have been several attacks that have exemplified the physic-
al reality of cyber-harm. Two of the most prominent are the recent
Ukrainian blackout [50], where malware facilitated the shut down
of a power plant and prevented essential systems from rebooting;
and the remote hijacking of the Jeep Cherokee, where white hat
hackers obtained full control of the vehicle, resulting in car manu-
facturer Chrysler recalling 1.4 million vehicles before any malicious
attack was attempted [51]. The Chrysler attack drew the attention
of the automotive industry to the risks that Internet-of-Things (IoT)
may pose to all manufacturers. These add to the other better-known
impacts of attacks including damaged corporate reputation, loss of
customers and business partners, and (financial) compensation to
affected parties; as witnessed by Sony, Target and Ashley Madison
[52]. It is evident that cyber-harm is potentially more than the sum
of the impacts considered in traditional risk assessments, and that a
novel taxonomy focusing on understanding the full spectrum of
cyber-harm is required. A similar rationale is presented in [53],
where the authors reflect on the notion of cyber-harm from a nation-
al perspective.
Defining a taxonomy of organizational
cyber-harm
To facilitate more effective reasoning about cyber-harm and to ad-
dress the various challenges identified regarding modelling it, it is
useful to describe a taxonomy for organizational harm. This should
outline the range of categories of harm and structure them in a way
that allows cascading harms to be considered, and in a format that
organizations would be able to apply during security risk analyses.
A key advantage would also be that it would force consideration of
harms not usually deemed ‘corporate’ and thus rarely properly
assessed. A good example of this is the psychological harm to indi-
viduals resulting from cyber-attacks. We present such a cyber-harm
taxonomy in this section. To support this research, in addition to
the literature considered above, we have conducted a comprehensive
survey of known cyber-incidents found in publicly available data-
bases [54, 55], in combination with case studies and news reports.
Taxonomy of cyber-harm
There have been several attempts to define the impacts of cyber-
attacks [2, 12, 56], however, their use and adoption has been lim-
ited. For our taxonomy, we have created and analysed a dataset of
news articles, literature and databases of cyber-incidents. More spe-
cifically, we have collected news articles, such as [57], published in
major newspapers and security magazines, which target national
and international audiences. To identify these articles, we searched
for articles that contained phrases such as, inter alia, ‘cyber attack’,
‘cyber incident’ and ‘hackers’, commonly used when cybersecurity
incidents are discussed. We reviewed literature focusing on taxono-
mies of harm ranging from white-collar crimes to psychology.
Finally, datasets such as Hackmageddon [54] and those from the
VERIS Community Database (VCDB) [55], albeit limited in the var-
iety of the cyber attacks they contain, were utilized due to the ab-
sence of more holistic datasets. VCDB is a public effort to collect
cybersecurity incident reports with a specified structure. Verizon
RISK team is responsible for the maintenance of the database, which
contains more than 5 000 incidents. Out of these incidents, we
focused on the most contemporary reports that contained informa-
tion relevant to our taxonomy, excluding incidents whose source
were physical attacks. Hackmageddon is a well-known cyber-inci-
dent website that collects public reports and document on a monthly



































































































basis. The same rationale as that applied with the VCDB regarding
extracting relevant incidents was followed here, and we again
focused on contemporary reports.
We then applied content analysis [58] to process the sources in
our dataset. Content analysis is a qualitative data analysis technique,
aiming to identify key ‘themes’ in documents. There are three
approaches to content analysis: the first is the inductive approach
that is based on ‘open coding’, meaning that the categories or
themes are freely created by the researcher. In open coding, headings
and notes are written in the transcripts while reading them and dif-
ferent categories are created to include similar notes that capture the
same aspect of the phenomenon under study. The second approach
is deductive content analysis that requires the prior existence of a
theory to underpin the classification process. This approach is more
structured than the inductive method and the initial coding is crafted
by the key features and variables of the adopted theory [58, 59]. In
the process of coding, excerpts are ascribed to categories and the
findings are dictated by the theory or prior research. However, there
could be novel categories that may contradict or enrich a specific
theory. Therefore, if deductive approaches are followed strictly,
these novel categories that offer a refined perspective may be
neglected. This is the reason why we opted for the third type, which
is a mixture of the deductive and inductive approaches.
We used harms identified in the literature of white-collar crimes
[18, 19] and other taxonomies of harm [2, 11, 60] as core themes
for our deductive approach. Themes to which we could not match
excerpts from articles and cyber-incident datasets were excluded
from our taxonomy. We then considered excerpts that were not allo-
cated to any themes. This process was iterative; we created themes
based on an inductive approach and in the following iterations, we
merged themes which described substantially identical notions. We
concluded the process when there was an iteration in which no fur-
ther themes could be merged. Two researchers were involved in the
process of content analysis. The first person identified the themes
and the second verified the content by independently using the pro-
posed thematic schema to replicate the results of the first researcher.
Once we obtained all the relevant themes, we divided the harm
types into categories to form hierarchies of harm. Subsequently, we
reflected on the resulting structure in the context of a smaller set of
cyber-incidents to determine whether the harm from these incidents
could be modelled, and incorporating any refinements (e.g. identify
incidents that could not be described by the types of harm in the tax-
onomy) necessary. The hierarchies that we define in our taxonomy
contribute to the novelty of the research given that existing models
(e.g. [2, 12, 56]) only focus on lists of impacts and losses from
cyber-attacks. We believe that the provision of structure through a
harm taxonomy is useful, particularly in engaging with different
types of stakeholders who may be affected in different ways by
cyber-attacks. Moreover, it allows us later to consider how harms
propagate across and between different high- and low-level catego-
ries in the time period after an attack has occurred. In Fig. 1, we pre-
sent our taxonomy for organizational cyber-harm, where the main
categories are coloured in orange and the subtypes of harm in
yellow.
To structure our taxonomy, we have taken inspiration from
existing research on categorizations of harm [18, 19]. The main
harm types we include are:
• Physical or Digital harm (i.e. harm describing a physical or digit-
al negative effect on someone or something)
• Economic harm (i.e. harm that relates to negative financial or
economic consequences)
• Psychological harm (i.e. harm which focuses on an individual
and their mental well-being and psyche)
• Reputational harm (i.e. harm pertaining to the general opinion
held about an entity)
• Social and Societal harm (i.e. a capture of harms that may result
in a social context or society more broadly) [2, 61, 62].
For each one of these types, we identified several sub-types that
characterized that harm in further detail. In Tables 1–5 below, we
present and describe the main sub-types as well as including appro-
priate references to articles that exemplify them. Harm types are
designed to be distinctive, however, all types may be attempted to be
interpreted in economic terms. Thus, economic harm may overlap
with other harm types.
Briefly reflecting on a selection of the harm definitions contained
above: examples of Reputational harms that an organization may
suffer as a result of a cyber-incident are damaged public image of an
organization (e.g. an organization may be regarded as insecure or in-
capable of protecting customer data) and reduced corporate good-
will (i.e. the business becomes one that others are reluctant to
interact or trade with). Harms in the Social and Societal space range
from negative changes of public perception (e.g. after an attack, the
public may view a certain type of technology as unreliable or inse-
cure), to the disruption of the daily lives of the public. For instance,
the cyber-attack on a Ukrainian power company caused a blackout
that affected 700 000 homes, numerous communities and society as
a whole in the country [50]. This attack had imminent impact on so-
ciety and the harm caused is analogous to the speed of detection and
the effective mitigation controls in place. As nations, and subse-
quently organizations, vary in their cybersecurity maturity, the
extent of these harms will vary as well.
Physical or Digital harm is one of the most familiar types of
harm for organizations, and examples of it are: damaged or unavail-
able systems; corrupted data files; exfiltration or theft of sensitive or
customer data; and bodily injury to employees or customers. From
these examples, it can be seen that at the current description level of
the taxonomy (as shown in Fig. 1) assets are not specifically named.
This is intentional and enables users of the taxonomy either to main-
tain a separate asset listing (or asset taxonomy) and map the two as
necessary, or to add a different category in this taxonomy to detail
the relevant assets that may be harmed in that particular way. Our
decision was informed by the fact that management of such assets is
achieved by different methodologies in organizations. Abstracting
the taxonomy as arranged above follows a similar approach to one
of the most well-known computer incident taxonomies [75].
One of the intended advantages of our taxonomy is its clear
mapping of the key types and sub-types of cyber-harm. In the face of
an incident, therefore, organizations could quickly obtain some gen-
eral understanding of the types of resulting harm that they may face.
This is also important because it may force consideration of aspects
not usually deemed ‘corporate’ and thus rarely properly assessed.
Moreover, this broadens understanding of risk and could be incor-
porated during initial risk assessment phases as well. A good ex-
ample of this is the psychological harm to individuals. If a business
is victim to a cyber-attack, this not only impacts them but also indi-
viduals including customers and employees. In the attack on UK
Internet Service Provider TalkTalk in 2015, customers not only
experienced financial loss, but felt worried and upset about the at-
tack and TalkTalk’s response [70, 71]. This could be of interest to
an organization because such harms could be prolonged and further
impact company reputation and repeat customer business, or result
in customers recommending that their friends and colleagues



































































































completely avoid the company. Social-media platforms such as
Twitter can exacerbate this harm due to the great visibility they give
to customers and the public [35]. This highlights a subset of the
wide span of consequential harms, captured in the taxonomy, that
result from cyber-incidents.
The propagation of cyber-harm
As the literature from criminology and cyber-economics suggests
[18, 19, 24, 25], harm has interesting characteristics that relate to
cascading effects. In this section, we consider four case studies of
real-world attacks, which provide initial insights into how our tax-
onomy can be used to identify propagation sequences of different
types of cyber-harm, thus illustrating how cyber-harm can emerge
and cascade. The four case studies were chosen based on the detailed
accounts of the impact of cyber-attacks in the organizations that
was publicly available, and because of the long-lasting effects of
these attacks. Using the harms in our taxonomy shown in Fig. 1, we
identify the assets that were targeted in the case studies, which types
of harm occurred first and how these harms in turn triggered differ-
ent types of harm. Our aim is to explore common sequences of
harms, which may be likely to result given that an initial harm has
Figure 1. Taxonomy of organizational cyber-harms.



































































































occurred. We perform this analysis here in order to demonstrate
that the taxonomy can adequately characterize harms arising in such
scenarios. This could, however, also be used in gaining a better
understanding of the broader risk facing the organization along the
dimensions proposed by Beck and Giddens [15–17].
The Sony cases
In April 2011, amid unstable economic conditions, Sony announced
that personal information for 77 million PlayStation Network (PSN)
subscribers as well as 24.6 million Sony Online Entertainment
accounts had been exposed due to an external breach [64]. The data
Table 1. Defining elements in the taxonomy for the physical or digital harm type
Cyber-harm type Cyber-harm sub-type
Physical or digital Damaged or unavailable – The asset has been physically or digitally affected to the point where it is not available to fulfil
its intended purpose [57]
Destroyed – The asset has been physically or digitally ruined [12]
Theft – The asset has been physically or digitally stolen [63]
Compromised – The asset has been physically or digitally affected [63]
Infected – The asset has been physically or digitally contaminated [50]
Exposed or leaked – The asset has been physically or digitally disclosed [64]
Corrupted – The asset has been physically or digitally debased or its integrity affected [50]
Reduced performance – The asset has had its ability to function lowered [57]
Bodily injury – The body of the human asset has been wounded [12]
Pain – The human asset has experienced agony [12]
Loss of life – The human asset is no longer alive [65]
Prosecution – Legal proceedings have been launched against an individual or organization [57, 66]
Abuse – The asset has been physically or digitally misused [67]
Mistreatment – The asset has been physically or digitally brutalized [67]
Identity theft – The theft of personal identity information [67]
Table 2. Defining elements in the taxonomy for the economic harm type
Cyber-harm type Cyber-harm sub-type
Economic Disrupted operations – The operational assets (e.g. processes) are not functioning as expected [12]
Disrupted sales or turnover – The amount of sales or turnover of the organization has been reduced [52]
Reduced customers – The number of customers of the organization has dropped [52]
Reduced profits – The profits of the organization have dropped [52, 68]
Reduced growth – The growth of the organization has dropped [68]
Reduced investments – The investments made by external parties into the organization have dropped [67]
Fall in stock price – The stock price of the organization has dropped [67]
Theft of finances – Finances of the organization have been stolen [69]
Loss of finances or capital – Finances or capital have been diminished [67]
Regulatory fines – Fines levied by regulatory bodies that the organization is liable to pay [12]
Investigation costs – The fees payable by the organization for investigating an incident [67]
PR response costs – The fees payable by the organization for engaging a public relations after an incident [67]
Compensation payments – The costs that the organization has had to pay as compensation to those affected by the incident [70]
Extortion payments – The costs that the organization has had to pay to continue its operations (e.g. after ransom-related incidents)
[65]
Loss of jobs – The organization has had to reduce its number of employees [12]
Scam victims – The organization or its stakeholders have been conned [65]
Table 3. Defining elements in the taxonomy for the psychological harm type
Cyber-harm type Cyber-harm sub-type
Psychological Confusion – Disarray experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [70, 71]
Discomfort – Uneasiness experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [35, 70, 71]
Frustration – Dissatisfaction experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [57]
Worry or anxiety – Nervousness experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [57]
Feeling upset – Anger experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [70, 71]
Depressed – Low-spiritedness experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [65]
Embarrassed – Humiliation experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [65]
Shameful – Disgracefulness experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [65]
Guilty – Regret or remorsefulness experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [65]
Loss of self-confidence – Lack of courage or certainty experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [50]
Low satisfaction – Lack of contentment experienced by the organization’s stakeholders [72]
Negative changes in perception – An adverse change in how stakeholders regard a stakeholder [65]



































































































breach involved information about account logins, passwords, credit
card details, purchase histories and billing addresses. Sony’s facilities
in Japan were also heavily impacted from the earthquake of March
2011, resulting in the suspension of several critical operations,
which rendered the cyber-attack well timed to inflict maximum
damage. Sony had to place its PSN services offline the day following
the attack [67] to assess the extent of the incident, resulting in loss
of revenue; incurred response costs regarding identifying and
addressing the vulnerabilities exploited and notifying the customers;
a rough estimate of the costs is $171 million. This figure, however,
does not include punitive damages from lawsuits, costs from identity
theft or any other misuse of stolen credit cards, nor the loss of busi-
ness and market capitalization [67].
In late April 2011, Sony provided a comprehensive recovery plan
and an accurate calculation of the costs inflicted from the earth-
quake, but they were still not yet able to calculate the full organiza-
tional harm from the cyber-attack [64]. The aggregated impact of
the earthquake and the data breach resulted in a significant decrease
in Sony’s market evaluation as depicted in stock-exchange markets.
Sony’s share price dropped 19% after the earthquake, a drop
equivalent to the general Japanese stock exchange market, but soon
recovered 50% of this loss [64]. After the cyber-attack, however,
Sony’s price sustained a 12% loss (this time it was not a reflection of
the rest of the Japanese economy), and the revelation of the security
weaknesses once Sony had restored service prolonged the recovery
phase [64].
Three years after these incidents, in November 2014, confiden-
tial data from Sony Pictures were once again leaked. The data
included more than 30 000 internal documents, 170 000 emails,
social-security numbers of Sony’s employees, personnel reviews and
medical histories, and movies which had not yet been released. The
same cyber-attack paralysed all of Sony’s systems, rendering the on-
line database of stock footage unsearchable, the telephone system
offline, computers and servers unusable; this was described by the
FBI as an ‘unprecedented digital assault that would have felled 90
per cent of companies it hit’ [57].
Sony was forced to replace a large number of its systems, set up
a hotline for identity fraud, provide psychological counselling for
employees and organize seminars on data security. Following the at-
tack, Sony’s employees received emails threatening their families if
they did not denounce Sony, their credit cards were available for
sale on Dark Net markets, and some witnessed their bank accounts
exceeding credit limits. A survey conducted by the Identity Theft
Resource Center regarding victims of identity theft, reported that
victims’ experienced ‘denial, frustration, rage, fear, betrayal, and
powerlessness in the days, weeks, and years after the violation’ [57].
Class-action lawsuits from employees were filed, either because
Sony did not notify those whose data was leaked, or over fears of
how personal leaked information could be potentially used. This
also contributed to the fact that some key staff left the company;
and furthermore, the press discovered Sony’s diversity issues,
which were discussed extensively in the content of the leaked emails
[57, 66].
The JP Morgan case
JP Morgan Chase, one of the largest banks in the USA, reported that
hackers obtained administrator access to several of their servers.
Information regarding names, phone numbers, email and physical
addresses of account holders was exfiltrated, affecting 76 million
households and seven million small businesses. JP Morgan had
announced an increase in their cybersecurity budget of $250 million
per year just before the attack occurred [76]. The company was
forced to replace the majority of its IT infrastructure, a process that
was time-consuming and hindered the daily lives of employees. The
remaining budget was spent hiring more than 1000 employees to
monitor the company’s systems [74]. Of significant interest are the
two long-term effects, which resulted from this hack. The majority
of the customers whose information was leaked were obliged to
monitor their finances in fear of fraud, while they received fake
emails directing them to impostor websites for financial exchanges.
As a result, many became victims of financial fraud. The second
Table 4. Defining elements in the taxonomy for the reputational harm type
Cyber-harm type Cyber-harm sub-type
Reputational Damaged public perception – An adverse change in how the public regards the organization [12]
Reduced corporate goodwill – A negative change in the established reputation of an organization [67]
Damaged relationship with customers – An adverse change in relationship between the organization and its customers [67]
Damaged relationship with suppliers – An adverse change in relationship between the organization and its suppliers [62]
Reduced business opportunities – A negative change in the chances for organizational expansion and growth [67]
Inability to recruit desired staff – Difficulty to attract and recruit appropriate employees for roles within the organization [73]
Media scrutiny – Media outlets continuously examining the organization [12]
Loss of key staff – Key employees within the organization have either been let go, reassigned, or have resigned [74]
Loss or suspension of accreditation or certifications – The organization has had its accreditation or certifications removed tempor-
arily or permanently [12]
Reduced credit scores – Stakeholders associated with the organization have had or are at risk of having their credit scores negative-
ly impacted [68]
Table 5. Defining elements in the taxonomy for the social and societal harm type
Cyber-harm type Cyber-harm sub-type
Social and societal Negative changes in public perception – An adverse change in how society generally regards the organization [52]
Disruption in daily life activities – Daily life activities and services in a society not functioning as expected [68]
Negative impact on nation – An adverse impact on how a nation (including its services, etc.) functions [50]
Drop in internal organization morale – A reduction how employees within the organization perceive that organization [57, 66]



































































































effect was the replacement of their chief information security officer
because of his inadequate collaboration with federal authorities in
an attempt to try to control the investigation and obscure the leak-
age of information [74].
The Ashley Madison case
In July 2015, details of 33 million accounts and personal informa-
tion about people registered on Ashley Madison, a website facilitat-
ing extramarital affairs, were leaked [63]. A core principle of Ashley
Madison’s business model was privacy and security, through which
they would build a trust relationship with their customers. The
cyber-attack, therefore, had dramatic consequences for the reputa-
tion of the company, not only because it exposed the vulnerabilities
of the system, but because it proved that Ashley Madison’s promise
to delete data upon customers’ request was not kept [77]. As a result
of this practice, Ashley Madison became liable to lawsuits [77], with
many organizations soliciting litigants on Twitter [72]. What are of
great interest in this case, however, are the repercussions of what
was coined as ‘collateral damage’ which are peculiar to the nature of
the services the website offered.
Once the data was publicly available and easily searchable, cus-
tomers became susceptible to blackmail, with professional and per-
sonal ramifications [72]. Many of the leaked email addresses
contained the ‘.mil’ domain, indicating people who serve in the US
military. Adultery, however, is a crime in the US military and mem-
bers of Ashley Madison were subject to a year of confinement or dis-
honourable discharge [77]. In a similar vein, owners of 1, 200 ‘.sa’
email addresses were exposed to a potential death sentence, which is
the punishment in Saudi Arabia for adultery. New practices of
cybercrime emerged, with criminals threatening to expose people
whose email addresses were found in the Ashley Madison dataset to
their ‘significant other’, unless $225 were paid in bitcoin [65].
Public figures were coerced into ‘painful personal admissions’,
others were divorced, while the Toronto police reported two sui-
cides potentially linked to the cyber-attack [65].
Analysis of case studies for propagation of harm
We start our analysis with a digest of the different types of harm
arising from the case studies and their impact on the organization
and its employees and customers. This is presented below as a visual
Figure 2. Propagation of harm after the cyber-attacks on Sony in 2011 (a) and 2014 (b), JPMorgan (c) and Ashley Madison (d).



































































































in Fig. 2, and then discussed in general in the remainder of the
section.
There are several salient points that can be seen in the cases
assessed. Focusing on one of the most prevalent classes of cyber-
attack in the literature, i.e. data breaches (e.g. details of JP Morgan
customers or employees at Sony), the direct type of harm which
occurs based on our taxonomy is ‘exposure or leakage of digital in-
formation’. As it is evident in the case studies presented above, dif-
ferent entities and stakeholders were affected by the various harms
that occurred (e.g. the organization under attack, its employees, cus-
tomers and suppliers).
We commence our analysis for the subsequent types of harm
from an organization’s perspective, since they are the main targets
of data breaches. The most prominent type of harm is ‘reputational
damage’, which may lead to ‘damaged relationships with employees
and customers’. By the time the attack is publicly announced, ‘eco-
nomic harms’ may be triggered due to potential regulatory fines
from ‘law enforcement’ (as happened in the case of Sony), which
may be amplified from relevant harms including ‘PR response costs’
(to give notice of the incident and to manage the company’s re-
sponse including both online and offline media), ‘reduced numbers
of customers, falls in stock prices and reduced growth’. A key point
to note here is that this harm propagation also alludes to the tem-
poral dimension present with risk more generally, as discussed in
Section ‘What is cyber-harm for organizations?’.
Departing from organizations and focusing our perspective on
employees and customers, ‘psychological’ harm is the most common
type of harm following ‘leakage of digital information’. People feel
‘confusion, discomfort, frustration’ and ‘worry’ and the magnitude
of these types of harm depends on the environment within which the
attack was realized. For example, when a financial institution such
as JP Morgan has been breached, psychological harms were more se-
vere than in the Sony case. In the cases where individuals were
blackmailed additional types of harm such as ‘extortion payments’
occurred. In a similar vein, ‘identity theft’ may be experienced and
this can result in compensation payments by the banking sector. In
extreme circumstances, the ultimate example being that of Ashley
Madison, where psychological harms resulted in ‘loss of life’ because
individuals felt ‘shamed’ and ‘embarrassed’. Regarding ‘social
harm’, it may occur in situations where not all the aforementioned
types of harm are addressed appropriately and in a timely manner.
An example where such a harm was manifested is the Sony case,
where there was ‘disruption of daily lives’ and a ‘drop in internal
organization morale’.
It should be evident that in the cases presented above that the se-
quence of types of harm, which occurred when information was
leaked, is similar, the main difference being the impact and the
length of the chain describing the propagation of different types of
harm. These attributes depend on how well, and timely, stakehold-
ers who were responsible for addressing harmful situations respond
to the events that unfold. Thus, as alluded to in Fig. 2, there is a tem-
poral element that is critical to the propagation of harm which is
also related to the quality of controls thatorganizations have in place
to mitigate harms.
In a similar vein, we can observe how types of harm unfold when
the assets under attack are ‘destroyed’. Starting from an organ-
ization’s perspective, emerging harms are ‘disrupted operations,
deteriorating sales’ and ‘loss of key staff’ (in cases where they are
forced to resign). It is important to note that the types of direct harm
that manifest in most cases depend on the assets exploited by the
attacks. The presence of subsequent waves of harm is influenced by
the remediation measures, which organizations have in place. As a
pattern, ‘physical’ harms lead to ‘economic’ harms, which if not
addressed may lead to ‘reputational’ harms for organizations. When
‘psychological’ harms for employees occur after ‘physical harms’,
then ‘economic’ and ‘physical’ harms may follow for employees and
customers. The presence of such types of harm may amplify the ‘eco-
nomic’, ‘reputational’ and more scarcely ‘social’ harms that organ-
izations already experience.
To reflect more generally on the cases in terms of commonalities
in harm propagation, exposed or leaked data, especially when it
contains personal information, usually has a significant impact on
the organization and its customers. Customers often feel confused
and frustrated, and this may escalate significantly depending on the
data that has been leaked (sometimes it may be identity theft, and
other times loss of life). As certain personal information is held for
life such as names and social security numbers, the harm associated
with a cyber-attack can last for years—this is particularly why more
companies are offering credit-monitoring services after data leaks.
Similar broad propagation effects can be also seen in more recent
hacks including that of Equifax in 2017 [78] and the Singapore gov-
ernment’s national health database in 2018 [79].
In terms of the organizational harms, the leakage of data typical-
ly has some negative impact on operations, and tends to involve PR
response costs and loss in revenue in some. A subsequent harm that
is often incurred by the organization is a damaged relationship with
customers, suppliers and the public. Possibly the largest difference in
the cases is the exact harm that can result. With Ashley Madison,
this related in loss of life due to suicide, which may be understand-
able given the personal nature of the data leaked. For JPMorgan,
however, we saw the reassignment of the executive in charge of pro-
tecting their network. To consider our earlier reflections on risk in
Section ‘What is cyber-harm for organizations?’, it is unclear
whether this represented some instance of ‘organised irresponsibil-
ity’ or poor management of incident response.
To consider the situation today, there are several recent exam-
ples of similar propagations of organizational harm—for instance,
the case of Facebook and Cambridge Analytica in 2018 [80]. Here,
the ‘end’ harm of this incident was the closure of latter, and regula-
tory fines and severe public criticism for the former. It is the un-
known nature of such attack consequences that may lead to some
organizations attempting to avoid harm propagation using other —
potentially questionable—means. The Uber breach is an intriguing
example of this, where the company opted to secretly pay hackers
rather than publicly revealing the leak of details of 57 million cus-
tomers and drivers [81].
It is important to understand the propagation trends of harm, as
we may be able to ascertain what the likely harm is in future attacks
and put in place measures to mitigate it. This is a very different lens
to that of a kill-chain [82], which seeks to explain the phases of an
attack. If we were to orientate a defensive strategy solely around a
kill-chain then we might find ourselves investing in the defensive
measures and incident responses, which are not actually tightly
coupled with limiting the harm to the organization.
Conclusions, reflection and future work
Technological advancements have forced organizations to digitalize
parts of their functionality and operations. While investments in IT
may result in profit and prosperity, there is always the risk lurking
of cyber-attacks and incidents. The threat landscape of cyber-
attacks is rapidly changing and the impact of such attacks is
uncertain. There is, however, as we showed on Section ‘What is



































































































cyber-harm for organizations?’, a lack of effective metrics, tools and
frameworks seeking to understand and assess the harm organ-
izations face from cyber-attacks.
According to the CUNA president and CEO Jim Nussie, organ-
izations are not incentivized to invest in and prioritize security [83].
It is of paramount importance for board members to obtain a com-
prehensive cost-benefit analysis on how cutting-edge technologies
and investments in implementing strong cybersecurity practices may
hedge the risk of a cyber-attack and its harmful impact. The case
studies presented in Section ‘The propagation of cyber-harm’ illus-
trated that organizations lack sufficient models to estimate the
harm, direct and indirect, from cyber-attacks. What it is further evi-
dent from our analysis of the case studies is that organizations re-
main oblivious to the harms that consumers or their employees
experience. Therefore, it is impossible without a holistic understand-
ing of all possible harms for organizations to prioritize controls to
mitigate these harms. Current practices which organizations adopt
either myopically calculate the harm from a cyber-attack or estimate
financial damages from the stock-market exchanges. In this way,
they neglect the indirect harms resulting from cyber-attacks and the
harms that consumers experience; these harms are not always visible
and may have more longitudinal effects.
Based on a thorough literature review and on analysing a series
of cyber-incidents, we have presented a taxonomy of cyber-harms
aimed at providing further insight into the direct and indirect harms
which organizations and individuals may experience. Our expect-
ation is that our taxonomy should provide the essential broad know-
ledge of harms for organizations, enable them to consider indirect
harms to consumers and other corporate and non-corporate actors,
as well as shift the current tendency of organizations to remain in-
active or tolerate harms which impact non-corporate actors. We
hope to avoid situations and perspectives such as the following,
where the former executive director of Sony Pictures was reported
stating ‘[I]t’s a valid business decision to accept the risk of a security
breach. I will not invest $10 million to avoid a possible $1 million
loss’ in 2005 [83]. The reality is that cyber-attacks can have much
more significant and long-lasting harms beyond what is initially per-
ceived. Our taxonomy would help to elucidate these, and thereby
support better decision-making in risk management and the selec-
tion of security controls.
While we believe that our taxonomy elucidates many of the key
aspects of cyber-harm for organizations, we emphasize that this
version is especially intended to motivate further discourse on this
topic in the field. As such, there are several outstanding questions
still to be addressed. For example, is this taxonomy of harm able to
capture and usefully structure all the types of harm that may occur
to organizations as a result of a cyber-incident? Although we
sought to be comprehensive in our research, by considering real
cases and relevant literature, we appreciate that discussions with
business and security professionals in organizations, particularly
those that have suffered a cyber-incident, may lead to an expanded
set of harm categories or a refined harm structure. A key activity,
therefore, is the expansion of the taxonomy in Fig. 1, and charac-
terization of more rigorous and useful harm quantification metrics
and magnitudes.
Although there has been significant research in the space of
understanding the impact of cyber-incidents, as discussed in previ-
ous sections, the lack of a model which can support analytics
regarding the detection, measurement, prediction and prioritization
of cyber-harms is evident. The taxonomy developed and presented
in this article is essential to the creation of such a model, which can
then underpin analytics—such analytics include a more functional
understanding of how we might go about modelling the intercon-
nections that exist between harms, and so the possible cascading
effects.
Therefore, our next steps are to extend this research by designing
an asset-oriented model. Our decision is based on the fact that such
an approach encourages organizations to focus on their core assets,
and think beyond current threats to consider the full range of harms
that might potentially result to assets. Reflecting on our taxonomy
and the case studies presented in the article, we believe that such a
model should comprise six different stages in defining and assessing
the notion of cyber-harm. These are: identifying core assets; identify-
ing direct harm to assets; determining the stakeholders that hold an
interest in direct harm; identifying different types of cyber-harm
occurring from the direct harm; measuring the overall indirect harm
(i.e. propagating harm) for all the stakeholders; and understanding
this variety of cyber-harm and security controls in place that might
be able to treat it.
Every stakeholder may perceive or experience harm differently,
and the consequences of cyber-attacks should be assessed based on
their views, resulting in the existence of different ‘lenses’ to examine
cyber-harm. We believe that such a model is crucially required if
organizations are to optimally structure their cybersecurity controls
for minimizing harms. This is especially relevant as technologies
such as the IoT and Artificial Intelligence (AI) mature and become
widely deployed, and organizations look to manage risk—be it
through internal methods or investment in cyber-insurance [84].
Our review of the literature suggests that the majority of successful
cyber-attacks exploit well-known vulnerabilities and the inertia of
organizations to provide appropriate cybersecurity policies due to
the misconception of the risks that may emerge. It is, therefore, cru-
cial for board members to obtain an accurate estimate of direct and
indirect harm from cyber-attacks before reconsidering the threat
landscape their organizations face. We believe a taxonomy of harms
is a decisive first step towards this direction.
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